This study examines the relation between equity ownership composition and insolvency risk for savings and loans (S&Ls). We hypothesize that the effect of manager/stockholder alignments on bank risk-taking is contingent on the trade-off between stockholders' incentives for risk provided by deposit insurance subsidies and their disincentives based on the regulatory price for risk imposed under alternative regulatory regimes. In support of this hypothesis, we find that S&Ls with a high concentration of managerial stock ownership exhibit greater risk-taking behavior than other S&Ls in 1988, a period of regulatory leniency and forbearance on S&L closures, but lower risk-taking behavior in 1991, a period of regulatory stringency and nonforbearance. We also find S&Ls with a greater institutional investor ownership to have lower insolvency risk than other S&Ls in 1991.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Financial Management Association in its journal Financial Management.
Volume (Year): 24 (1995) Issue (Month): 3 (Fall) Pages: Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:cebenoyan95
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of South Florida 4202 E. Fowler Ave. COBA #3331 Tampa, FL 33620 Phone: 813-974-2084 Fax: 813-974-3318 Web page: http://www.fma.org/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Lanie Anderson).