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What assets should the Federal Reserve buy?

Author

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  • Alfred Broaddus
  • Marvin Goodfriend

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Broaddus & Marvin Goodfriend, 2001. "What assets should the Federal Reserve buy?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 7-22.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2001:i:win:p:7-22
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    File URL: https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/RichmondFedOrg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2001/winter/pdf/broaddus.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1994. "Why We Need an "Accord" for Federal Reserve Credit Policy: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 572-580, August.
    2. Alfred Broaddus & Marvin Goodfriend, 1996. "Foreign exchange operations and the Federal Reserve," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 1-20.
    3. Marvin Goodfriend, 2001. "Why we need an \\"accord\\" for Federal Reserve credit policy : a note," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-32.
    4. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
    5. Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. LaRoche, 1993. "Instruments of the money market," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 1993iotm.
    6. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, December.
    7. Robert L. Hetzel, 1997. "The case for a monetary rule in a constitutional democracy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 45-66.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Karel Brůna, 2010. "Akumulace devizových rezerv centrálních bank a dynamika absorpce likvidity bankovních systémů České republiky, Polska a Maďarska [Central Bank´s Foreign Exchange Reserves Accumulation and Dynamics ," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2010(6), pages 723-746.
    2. Mr. Eswar S Prasad & Raghuram Rajan, 2005. "Controlled Capital Account Liberalization: A Proposal," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 2005/007, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Keister, Todd, 2019. "The interplay between liquidity regulation, monetary policy implementation and financial stability," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 30-38.
    4. Goodfriend, Marvin, 2014. "Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 112-120.
    5. Carolin Schellhorn, 2020. "Financial System Stability, the Timing of Climate Change Action and the Federal Reserve," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 9(3), pages 45-59.
    6. Clyde Goodlet, 2010. "Too Big to Fail: A Misguided Policy in Times of Financial Turmoil," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 311, October.
    7. James W. Douglas & Ringa Raudla, 2020. "Who is Afraid of the Big Bad Debt? A Modern Money Theory Perspective on Federal Deficits and Debt," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 6-25, September.
    8. David A. Marshall, 2002. "Origins of the use of Treasury debt in open market operations: lessons for the present," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 26(Q I), pages 45-54.

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