What have we learned about mortgage default?
AbstractBy the end of 2009, one out of every 11 mortgages was seriously delinquent or in foreclosure. Economists have devoted considerable energy over the past several years to understanding the underlying causes of this increase in defaults. One goal is to provide a guide to dealing with the existing problems. In addition, a better understanding may help avoid future problems. In “What Have We Learned About Mortgage Default?” Ronel Elul reviews recent research that has shed light on two areas: the extent to which securitization is responsible for the increase in default rates; and the relative contributions of negative equity, compared with “liquidity shocks,” in explaining mortgage default.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its journal Business Review.
Volume (Year): (2010)
Issue (Month): Q4 ()
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- Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2010.
"Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 369-397, September.
- Vikrant Vig & Amit Seru & Tomasz Piskorski, 2009. "Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis," 2009 Meeting Papers 1169, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Patrick Bajari & Chenghuan Sean Chu & Minjung Park, 2008. "An Empirical Model of Subprime Mortgage Default From 2000 to 2007," NBER Working Papers 14625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009.
"Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages?: redefaults, self-cures, and securitization,"
Public Policy Discussion Paper
09-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? redefaults, self-cures, and securitization," Working Paper 2009-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization," NBER Working Papers 15159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2010.
"What explains differences in foreclosure rates?: a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig,"
10-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul Willen, 2010. "What explains differences in foreclosure rates? a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig," Working Paper 2010-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Ronel Elul & Nicholas S. Souleles & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Dennis & Glennon & Robert Hunt, 2010.
"What "triggers" mortgage default?,"
10-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362, February.
- Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1449-1496, November.
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