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Do \\"Too-Big-to-Fail\\" banks take on more risk?

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Abstract

The notion that some banks are ?too big to fail? builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of disorderly bank failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: Large, complex, or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they expect future rescues. This article studies the effect of potential government support on banks? appetite for risk. Using balance-sheet data for 224 banks in forty-five countries starting in March 2007, the authors find higher levels of impaired loans after an increase in government support. To measure support, they rely on Fitch Ratings? support rating floors (SRFs), a new rating that isolates potential sovereign support from other sources of external support. A one-notch rise in the SRF is found to increase the impaired loan ratio by roughly 0.2?an 8 percent increase for the average bank. The authors obtain similar results when they assess the effect of increased support on net charge-offs and when they narrow their sample to U.S. banks only.

Suggested Citation

  • Gara M. Afonso & João A. C. Santos & James Traina, 2014. "Do \\"Too-Big-to-Fail\\" banks take on more risk?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 41-58.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:00010
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    1. Anginer, Deniz & Warburton, A. Joseph, 2010. "The Chrysler effect : the impact of the Chrysler bailout on borrowing costs," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5462, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yener Altunbaş & John Thornton & Yurtsev Uymaz, 2021. "Money laundering and bank risk: Evidence from U.S. banks," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 4879-4894, October.
    2. Simona Malovana & Dominika Kolcunova & Vaclav Broz, 2017. "Does Monetary Policy Influence Banks' Perception of Risks?," Working Papers 2017/9, Czech National Bank.
    3. Behr, Patrick & Wang, Weichao, 2020. "The (un)intended effects of government bailouts: The impact of TARP on the interbank market and bank risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    4. Wu, Ji & Chen, Minghua & Jeon, Bang Nam & Wang, Rui, 2017. "Does foreign bank penetration affect the risk of domestic banks? Evidence from emerging economies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 45-61.
    5. Gündüz, Yalin, 2020. "The market impact of systemic risk capital surcharges," Discussion Papers 09/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2014_028 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Westman, Hanna, 2014. "Crisis performance of European banks – does management ownership matter?," Research Discussion Papers 28/2014, Bank of Finland.
    8. Bolortuya Enkhtaivan & Wenling Lu, 2021. "The effect of TARP on lending: Evidence from the lead bank’s share in syndicated loans," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1169-1193, November.
    9. David Martinez-Miera & Rafael Repullo, 2019. "Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Policy, and Financial Stability," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 809-832, August.
    10. Chen, Minghua & Wu, Ji & Jeon, Bang Nam & Wang, Rui, 2017. "Monetary policy and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 116-140.
    11. Malovaná, Simona & Kolcunová, Dominika & Brož, Václav, 2019. "Does monetary policy influence banks’ risk weights under the internal ratings-based approach?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 1-1.
    12. Robert C. Merton & Richard T. Thakor, 2015. "Customers and Investors: A Framework for Understanding Financial Institutions," NBER Working Papers 21258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Bats, Joost V. & Houben, Aerdt C.F.J., 2020. "Bank-based versus market-based financing: Implications for systemic risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    14. Fonseka, Mohan & Richardson, Grant & Shekhar, Chander & Yang, Xing, 2023. "The impact of social trust on loan grants and default risk: Evidence from China’s regional commercial banks during branching policy changes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    15. Boris Cournède & Oliver Denk & Peter Hoeller, 2015. "Finance and Inclusive Growth," OECD Economic Policy Papers 14, OECD Publishing.
    16. Simon Firestone & Amy Lorenc & Ben Ranish, 2017. "An Empirical Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital in the US," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-034, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Azadeh Zohrehvand & Saifuzzaman Ibrahim & Muzafar Shah Habibullah & Zulkornain Yusop & Nik Ahmad Sufian Burhan, 2020. "Influence of Governance on the Relationship Between Foreign Banks’ Penetration and Banking Stability," Asian Journal of Empirical Research, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 10(11), pages 231-238, November.
    18. Chen, Minghua & Wu, Ji & Jeon, Bang Nam & Wang, Rui, 2017. "Do foreign banks take more risk? Evidence from emerging economies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 20-39.
    19. Cabrera, Matias & Dwyer, Gerald P. & Nieto, Maria J., 2018. "The G-20′s regulatory agenda and banks’ risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 66-78.
    20. Beladi, Hamid & Hu, May & Park, Jason & How, Janice, 2020. "Liquidity creation and funding ability during the interbank lending crunch," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    21. Chennells, Lucy & Wingfield, Venetia, 2015. "Bank failure and bail-in: an introduction," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(3), pages 228-241.
    22. Siegert, Casper & Willison, Matthew, 2015. "Financial Stability Paper 32: Estimating the extent of the ‘too big to fail’ problem – a review of existing approaches," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 32, Bank of England.
    23. Chen, Minghua & Jeon, Bang Nam & Wang, Rui & Wu, Ji, 2015. "Corruption and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 122-148.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government support; Too-big-to-fail;

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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