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Can a \\"credit crunch\\" be efficient?

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  • Edward J. Green
  • Soo-Nam Oh

Abstract

Two observations have sometimes been viewed as evidence that the equilibrium allocations of intermediated credit markets are inefficient. First, low-income households' marginal propensity to consume is close to unity. Second, even high-income households seem to face nonprice constraints during recessions. This paper presents a model that possesses both of these features. (A recession is modeled as an economy in which the equilibrium level of investment is at its lowest possible level.) However, contrary to the conventional view, the equilibrium of this model is ex ante efficient. The model also sheds light on some historical episodes of credit restraint.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Green & Soo-Nam Oh, 1991. "Can a \\"credit crunch\\" be efficient?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 15(Fall), pages 3-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1991:i:fall:p:3-17:n:v.15no.4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mingwei Yuan & Christian Zimmermann, 2000. "Financial Intermediation with Heterogeneous Projects: An Application to the Japanese Credit Crunch," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 115, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
    2. Mingwei Yuan & Christian Zimmermann, 1999. "Credit Crunch, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy: A Model of Financial Intermediation with Heterogeneous Projects," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 89, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
    3. David Backus & Silverio Foresi & Liuren Wu, 2002. "Contagion in Financial Markets," Finance 0207009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Yuan, Mingwei & Zimmermann, Christian, 2004. "Credit crunch in a model of financial intermediation and occupational choice," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 637-659, December.
    5. Pecchenino, Rowena A., 1998. "Risk averse bank managers: Exogenous shocks, portfolio reallocations and market spillovers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 161-174, February.

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