Job characteristics, wages, and the employment contract
AbstractThis paper discusses some recent evidence exploring job characteristics and labor market conditions upon contract form. We find that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in observed employment contracts in the US, some of which may be explained by firms Nous analysons, dans cet article, le lien empirique entre les caractÃ©ristiques des emplois ainsi que les conditions macroÃ©conomiques locales et la forme que prennent les contrats de travail. Nous observons qu'il y a une grande variÃ©tÃ© dans la forme des contrats rÃ©gissant la relation d'emploi et que certains de ces contrats peuvent Ãªtre expliquÃ©s par le fait que les firmes ajustent la faÃ§on de compenser leurs travailleurs aux caractÃ©ristiques des emplois. Nous trouvons Ã©galement que l'utilisation de bonis est plus probable lorsque le marchÃ© local du travail est caractÃ©risÃ© par un faible taux de chÃ´mage. De plus, il est montrÃ© que la frÃ©quence d'utilisation de bonis par les firmes amÃ©ricaines a augmentÃ© au cours des 15 derniÃ¨res annÃ©es.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its journal Review.
Volume (Year): (1999)
Issue (Month): May ()
Other versions of this item:
- W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics, Wages and the Employment Contract," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-37, CIRANO.
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