1. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Weitzman, Martin L, 1985. "Profit Sharing as Macroeconomic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 41-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Working Papers 1997-006, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
6. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2002. "Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Heuristic Search," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
7. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21. [Downloadable!]
8. Charles Brown, 1990. "Firms' choice of method of pay," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 165-182, February.
   Other versions:
   • Charles Brown, 1990. "Firms' Choice of Method of Pay," NBER Working Papers 3065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Moulton, Brent R., 1986. "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 385-397, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Dye, Ronald A, 1985. "Costly Contract Contingencies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 233-50, February.
12. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
13. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics and the Form of Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-08, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
14. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Marcel Boyer & Armel Jacques & Michel Moreaux, 1998. "Better Observability Promotes the Adoption of More Flexible Technologies," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-38, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Boyer, M. & Jacques, A. & Moreaux, M., 1998. "Better Observability Promotes the Adoption of more Flexible Technologies," Papers 98.505, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," IEW - Working Papers iewwp191, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers in Economics 335, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 4464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(3), pages 453-474, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Daniel Parent, 2001. "Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
4. Carstensen, Vivian, 2002. "The From-Tayloristic-to-Holistic-Organization Model From an Empirical Perspective," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-256, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
5. Jérôme Foulon & Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, 1999. "Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or (and?) Information," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-11, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]