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Why HARM the subprime borrower?

Author

Listed:
  • Rajdeep Sengupta
  • Yu Man Tam

Abstract

Hybrid adjustable rate mortgages (HARM) were designed to be refinanced by the reset date, when the interest rate would jump. These mortgages worked out well for many people who were credit risks - but only as long as housing prices continued to rise.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajdeep Sengupta & Yu Man Tam, 2010. "Why HARM the subprime borrower?," The Regional Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Apr, pages 21-22.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlre:y:2010:i:apr:p:21-22
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Gorton, 2008. "The panic of 2007," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 131-262.
    2. Gary Gorton, 2009. "The Subprime Panic," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(1), pages 10-46, January.
    3. Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, 2008. "Did prepayments sustain the subprime market?," Working Papers 2008-039, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    4. Gary Gorton, 2009. "The Subprime Panic," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(1), pages 10-46, January.
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    Keywords

    Subprime mortgage;

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