The case for preserving regulatory distinctions
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in its journal Proceedings.
Volume (Year): (1987)
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- Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 2013. "Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation," Research Papers 2132, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Talley, Samuel H., 1993. "Are failproof banking systems feasible? Desirable?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1095, The World Bank.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2013. "Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation," Economics Papers 2013-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Jerry L. Jordan, 1994. "A Market Approach to Banking Regulation," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 13(3), pages 315-337, Winter.
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