Japanese banks and market discipline
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its journal Chicago Fed Letter.
Volume (Year): (1999)
Issue (Month): Aug ()
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Web page: http://www.chicagofed.org/
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- Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2000. "The evolution of "too-big-to-fail" policy in Japan: evidence from market equity values," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 00-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2003.
"Determinants of voluntary bank disclosure: evidence from Japanese Shinkin banks,"
Pacific Basin Working Paper Series
03-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2004. "Determinants of Voluntary Bank Disclosure: Evidence from Japanese Shinkin Banks," CESifo Working Paper Series 1135, CESifo Group Munich.
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