FSLIC forbearances to stockholders and the value of savings and loan shares
AbstractAn investigation of the value of FSLIC forbearances to the stockholders of insolvent stock-chartered thrift institutions, concluding that these forbearances increase the stock-market value of thrift institutions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its journal Economic Review.
Volume (Year): (1987)
Issue (Month): Q III ()
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