Theories of interjurisdictional competition
AbstractWhat behavior can be expected from state and local governments, given market-analogy theories of intergovernmental competition (competition enhances efficiency) and game-theoretic models (competition is destructive)? How does the real world depart from these paradigms? What empirical hypotheses do they imply concerning the effectiveness of alternative competitive public policies? Paper: Daphne A. Kenyon Discussion: Caroline M. Hoxby, Andrew Reschovsky
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its journal New England Economic Review.
Volume (Year): (1997)
Issue (Month): Mar ()
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