This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Financing housing through government-sponsored enterprises

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
W. Scott Frame
Larry Wall

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System-were created to improve the availability of home mortgage financing by supplementing local funding. But today's more evolved financial markets enable retail lenders to tap national markets. Thus, the main contribution of the three housing GSEs has become providing homebuyers an interest rate subsidy that is made possible by the GSEs' special relationship with the federal government. ; This article examines the economic issues arising from the provision of such subsidies via the housing GSEs. The authors first review the benefits and costs of subsidizing housing finance and then provide background information about the housing GSEs and their relationship to the federal government. The GSEs' importance to the financial markets, coupled with their special relationship with the government, raises concerns about the potential for moral hazard and the problems that would arise if a housing GSE became financially distressed or insolvent. ; The discussion then focuses on two public policy debates that have been sparked by this special relationship. The first is whether the housing GSEs are efficient mechanisms for subsidizing housing. The second relates to the housing GSEs' safety and soundness and questions whether implicit guarantees of their liabilities are the best way to subsidize them.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/frame_wall.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its journal Economic Review.

Volume (Year): (2002)
Issue (Month): Q1 ()
Pages: 29-43
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedaer:y:2002:i:q1:p:29-43:n:v.87no.1

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1000 Peachtree St., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Phone: 404-521-8500
Email:
Web page: http://www.frbatlanta.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Government-sponsored enterprises ; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ; Federal National Mortgage Association ; Federal home loan banks;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 1-14. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mark D. Flood, 1992. "The great deposit insurance debate," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 51-77. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard Baker, 2001. "The financial safety net: five free-market principles for policymaking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 23-31.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert A. Eisenbeis & W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall, 2006. "An analysis of the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an evaluation of the policy options for reducing those risks," Working Paper 2006-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. W. Scott Frame, 2003. "Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchases: Implications for mortgage markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q3, pages 17-31. [Downloadable!]
  3. Frank A. Schmid, 2003. "Conjectural guarantees loom large: evidence from the stock returns of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Working Papers 2003-031, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Karsten Jeske & Dirk Krueger, 2005. "Housing and the macroeconomy: the role of implicit guarantees for government-sponsored enterprises," Working Paper 2005-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 488-506. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ron Feldman, 2002. "Mortgage rates, homeownership rates, and government-sponsored enterprises," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, pages 4-23. [Downloadable!]
  7. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Working Paper 2004-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  8. W. Scott Frame & Larry Wall, 2002. "Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's voluntary initiatives: Lessons from banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q1, pages 45-59. [Downloadable!]
  9. Frank A. Schmid, 2005. "Stock return and interest rate risk at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 35-48. [Downloadable!]
  10. Lawrence J. White & W. Scott Frame, 2004. "Emerging Competition and Risk-Taking Incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Working Papers 04-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was sponsored from 1997 to 2002 by the Université du Québec à Montréal.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-1.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.