Too Many Municipalities?
AbstractDoes democracy lead to the creation of too many municipalities? We analyze this issue within the context of the Alesina and Spolare (1996) model where the quality of municipal services deteriorates with the distance from the center of a municipality. Individuals can vote in a referendum to split an existing municipality. We show that social welfare will decline when municipalities are split if the level of the public service, as chosen by the median voter, is lower in the new smaller municipalities. In general, the model indicates that there may be a democratic bias in favour of creating too many municipalities.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) in its journal Revista Brasileira de Economia.
Volume (Year): 65 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Other versions of this item:
- Dahlby, Bev, 2009. "Too Many Municipalities?," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics 2009-18, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- BOGOMOLNAIA, Anna & LE BRETON, Michel & SAVVATEEV, Alexei & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005.
"Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules,"
CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
2005032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Michel Breton & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber, 2008. "Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 525-543, March.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2005. "Stability of Jurisdiction Structures under the Equal Share and Median Rule," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Ãconomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 362, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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