Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated
AbstractIn this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) in its journal Revista Brasileira de Economia.
Volume (Year): 54 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Other versions of this item:
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1999. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," Microeconomics, EconWPA 9901003, EconWPA, revised 21 Jan 1999.
- KLINGER MONTEIRO, Paulo, 1997. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1997042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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