Search with Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Agents
AbstractTwo types of agents want to pair. They meet randomly, and if each is acceptable to each other pairing takes place. One type's tastes are uniform over the other type while the other type's tastes are not. We assume nontransferable utility and study whether the outcome is more efficient when the type heterogeneous in tastes searches or vice versa.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klaus Kultti & Antti Miettunen & Juha Virrankoski, 2006. "Physical Search," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 223-244, December.
- Klaus Kultti & Antti Miettunen & Tuomas Takalo & Juha Virrankoski, 2009. "Who Searches?," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(2), pages 152-171.
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