Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance under Adverse Selection
AbstractFair pricing of deposit insurance represents one of the most difficult problems of bank regulation. This paper introduces an incentive compatible mechanism such that fair (risk-based) deposit insurance premiums can be achieved under adverse selection. The deposit insurer screens banks by offering full insurance coverage for high-risk banks and partial coverage for low-risk banks. If deposit interest rates can be regulated, low-risk banks also obtain full coverage. The optimal solution may require dividing deposits into junior and senior deposits. More generally, our analysis connects deposit insurance with standard insurance theory.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 16 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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