Screening contracts when institutions matter : an example
AbstractBased on the notion of affiliation a model is developed which suggests that laws which restrict the firm's flexibility to adjust its employment force resume in higher requirements on potential employees. The paper demonstrates the interaction between the legal structures and individual firm's decision making, herein hiring practices.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 11 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
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