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Determinants of Public Sector Employee’s Performance in Pakistan

Author

Listed:
  • Imran Ali (Corresponding Author)

    (Assistant Professor, Center of Excellence for Research Department of Management Sciences COMSATS Institute of Information Technology Lahore, Pakistan)

  • Jawaria Fatima Ali

    (Center of Excellence for Research, Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology Lahore, Pakistan)

  • Dr Syed Hassan Raza

    (Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad)

Abstract

Public sector performance is focus of researchers since many years. The reason behind this is the difference of efficiency level between private and public sector organizations. The study investigates the determinants of public sector employees performance for the case of Pakistan. Data has been collected from 350 pubic sector officials belonging to various ministries of government of Pakistan. Multiple regression analysis technique has been used to analyze data though SPSS 17.0 version. The study found significantly positive effects of higher wages on public sector employees performance, moreover positive relationship was also found between enforcement of rules in the department, transparency of decisions in the department; meritocracy, honesty and lack of resources with public sector employees performance. Whereas, politicization of decision in the department and lack of voice of employees in the decisions of top management are having negative affects on the performance of public sector employees. The findings of this study are useful for policy makers concerned with improvement of public sector employees performance and future researchers on this topic.

Suggested Citation

  • Imran Ali (Corresponding Author) & Jawaria Fatima Ali & Dr Syed Hassan Raza, 2011. "Determinants of Public Sector Employee’s Performance in Pakistan," Far East Journal of Psychology and Business, Far East Research Centre, vol. 5(3), pages 23-29, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:fej:articl:v:5b:y:2011:i:3:p:23-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public sector; employee performance; politicization; meritocracy; Pakistan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration

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