Is One Watchdog Better than Three? International Experience with Integrated Financial-Sector Supervision (in English)
AbstractOver the past two decades, there has been a clear trend toward integrating the regulation and supervision of banks, nonbank financial institutions, and securities markets. This paper reviews the international experience with integrated supervision. The authors survey the theoretical arguments for and against the integrated supervisory model, and use data on compliance with international standards to assess the validity of some of these arguments. The find that (i) integration is associated with a higher quality of supervision in insurance and securities and a higher consistency of supervision across sectors, after controlling for level of development; and (ii) integrated supervision is not associated with a significant reduction in supervisory staff.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences in its journal Finance a uver - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance.
Volume (Year): 56 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
financial sector; financial-services regulation; integrated supervision; prudential supervision; supervisory agencies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005.
"Cooperation in International Banking Supervision,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2004. "Cooperation in international banking supervision," Working Paper Series 0316, European Central Bank.
- Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn & Eva H. G. HÃ¼pkes, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 05/51, International Monetary Fund.
- Schoenmaker, Dirk, 2011.
"The financial trilemma,"
Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 57-59, April.
- Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management," IMF Working Papers 02/163, International Monetary Fund.
- Charles M. Kahn & João A. C. Santos, 2001.
"Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision,"
BIS Working Papers
102, Bank for International Settlements.
- Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
- Charles M. Kahn & João A.C. Santos, 2001. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision," Proceedings 717, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Richard Podpiera, 2006.
"Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(2), pages 5.
- Richard Podpiera, 2004. "Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?," IMF Working Papers 04/204, International Monetary Fund.
- Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn & Kina Chenard, 2004. "Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System Stability? An Empirical Analysis," IMF Working Papers 04/89, International Monetary Fund.
- Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003.
"Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,"
- Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," Development and Comp Systems 0308001, EconWPA.
- Richard K. Abrams & Michael Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 00/213, International Monetary Fund.
- Masahiro Kawai & Michael Pomerleano, 2010.
"Regulating Systemic Risk,"
Finance Working Papers
23014, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Kenneth Sullivan, 2008. "Presentación proactiva del desempeño," Boletín, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 130-135, Julio-sep.
- Banco Central Europeo, 2008. "La titulización en la zona del euro," Boletín, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 136-149, Julio-sep.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Herrmannova).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.