Agency theory and work incentives
AbstractAgency Theory and Work Incentives (by Maurizio Lisciandra) - ABSTRACT: This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives. Keywords: Agency Theory, Incentives, Labour Contracts
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by FrancoAngeli Editore in its journal STUDI ECONOMICI.
Volume (Year): 2007/91 (2007)
Issue (Month): 91 ()
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Web page: http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/sommario.asp?IDRivista=59
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