What’s Happening to the European Electricity Market?
AbstractThis paper deals with market power and information issues in the ongoing process of the European Electricity Market. We present a regulatory game played among the key group of utilities, the customers and the regulatory authority. The development of the game allows us to state for a clear commitment to entry freedom reducing the informational strategic advantage of incumbents. As the assumption of such a commitment involves another game, we develop it and we conclude that the liberalisation of entry is also a key factor for credibility and effectiveness of flexible regulation and tariffs reduction as well.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Research Studies Journal in its journal European Research Studies Journal.
Volume (Year): XV (2012)
Issue (Month): Special Issue on Energy ()
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Web page: http://www.ersj.eu/
Electricity Market; Competition; Regulation Games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
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