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What’s Happening to the European Electricity Market?

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Author Info

  • Isabel Soares
  • Andres Faina
  • Jose Lopez
  • Laura Varela-Candamio
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    Abstract

    This paper deals with market power and information issues in the ongoing process of the European Electricity Market. We present a regulatory game played among the key group of utilities, the customers and the regulatory authority. The development of the game allows us to state for a clear commitment to entry freedom reducing the informational strategic advantage of incumbents. As the assumption of such a commitment involves another game, we develop it and we conclude that the liberalisation of entry is also a key factor for credibility and effectiveness of flexible regulation and tariffs reduction as well.

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    File URL: http://www.ersj.eu/repec/ers/papers/12_SI_p7.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by European Research Studies Journal in its journal European Research Studies Journal.

    Volume (Year): XV (2012)
    Issue (Month): Special Issue on Energy ()
    Pages: 145-156

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    Handle: RePEc:ers:journl:v:xv:y:2012:i:sie:p:145-156

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    Web page: http://www.ersj.eu/

    Related research

    Keywords: Electricity Market; Competition; Regulation Games;

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    References

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    1. Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
    2. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
    3. Claude Crampes and Natalia Fabra, 2005. "The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ca change," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 127-154.
    4. Joanne Evans and Richard Green, 2005. "Why Did British Electricity Prices Fall after 1998?," Discussion Papers 05-13, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    5. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
    6. Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Pollitt, M.G., 2009. "Electricity Liberalisation in the European Union: A Progress Report," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0953, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
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