Divided over Iraq, United over Iran. A Rational Choice Explanation to European Irrationalities
AbstractThe War on Iraq in has split the continent into "Old Europe" and "New Europe". On Iran, by contrast, the Eu jointly acts in the context of a coordinated European foreign policy. The paper argues that both conflicts resemble an assurance game among the Europeans, in which the entailed trust dilemma prevented involved players from cooperating. It identifies the European "Dialogues" with Iran as a regime that reduced information deficits in the case of Iran. In the case of Iraq, however, European players were unable to mutually judge whether there was a hidden agenda or not - and thus opted for defection instead of cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium in its journal European Political Economy Review.
Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): Spring ()
European foreign policy; nuclear conflict; WMD; Iran; Iraq; assurance game; regime theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Goldthau, Andreas, 2008. "Divided over Iraq, United over Iran. A Rational Choice Explanation to European Irrationalities," MPRA Paper 7813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
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