The Moral Worth of Creatures: Neo-Classical Metaphysics and the Value Theories of Rolston and Callicott
AbstractAfter showing that Rolston's and Callicott's value theories are fundamentally flawed, I demonstrate that a value theory grounded in neoclassical, or process, metaphysics avoids the problems in, and incorporates insights from, these accounts. A fundamental thesis of neoclassical metaphysics is that individual creatures at all levels of reality (from non-sensuous, non-conscious to self-conscious) are subjects of experience. Since individuals are subjects, this value theory meets Callicott's legitimate demand that value requires a valuer. And because such subjectivity does not depend on consciousness, this theory meets Rolston's legitimate demand that intrinsic value not depend upon human valuation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by White Horse Press in its journal Environmental Values.
Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.erica.demon.co.uk
Environmental ethics; moral worth; intrinsic value; metaphysics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Value Theory
- Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects
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