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La regulación del tamaño de los lotes habitacionales: un modelo de discriminación de precios

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  • Daniel Flores Curiel

    (Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León)

Abstract

This paper presents a second degree price discrimination model to study regulation on the size of land for housing. The benchmark model considers a monopolist that sells two types of packages: small and large. Among other things, the paper shows that a relevant minimum property land size increases the price of the small package and reduces the price of the large package. Also, that there exists a minimum land size that is optimum from the social point of view. However, under certain conditions, social welfare can be reduced depending on the minimum that the authority sets.

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File URL: http://codex.colmex.mx:8991/exlibris/aleph/a18_1/apache_media/IPPNNVMNCFC54L4415ABKB2YJQ5H67.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.

Volume (Year): 25 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 407-424

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Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:25:y:2010:i:2:p:407-424

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Web page: http://www.colmex.mx/centros/cee/
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Related research

Keywords: regulation; size; housing;

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  1. Chae, Suchan, 1992. "Bundling subscription TV channels : A case of natural bundling," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 213-230, June.
  2. Schmalensee, Richard, 1984. "Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages S211-30, January.
  3. Lewbel, Arthur, 1985. "Bundling of substitutes or complements," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-107, March.
  4. Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August.
  5. Martin, Stephen, 1999. "Strategic and welfare implications of bundling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 371-376, March.
  6. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
  7. Seidmann, Daniel J, 1991. "Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Reinterpretation of Leverage Theory," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(232), pages 491-99, November.
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