Entre familia y amigos: la elección de la estructura de propiedad corporativa
AbstractThe document presents an analysis, developed under the framework of conflict theory, which models the choice of ownership structure as the result of a power struggle between the owner of a firm and potential shareholders. The theoretical model suggests that, when the system that protects property rights is inefficient, the choice of keeping the ownership of the firm within the family represents the strategy that provides the owner the highest value when going public.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.
Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
family firm; legal system; conflic theory.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G0 - Financial Economics - - General
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000.
"Investor Protection and Equity Markets,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1906, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
NBER Working Papers
5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ramon Castillo & Stergios Skaperdas, 2003.
"All in the Family or Public? Law and Appropriative Costs as Determinants of Ownership Structure,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
921, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ramon Castillo & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 93-104, 07.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
- Garfinkel,Michelle R. & Skaperdas,Stergios (ed.), 1996. "The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521560634, October.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Ritter, Jay R., 1987. "The costs of going public," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 269-281, December.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February.
- Steinwascher, William, 2007.
"Propiedad, gobierno corporativo y las estrategias de diversificación de las empresas mexicanas: Un estudio exploratorio
[Ownership, corporate governance and diversification strategies of Mexican f," MPRA Paper 11599, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rocío Contreras).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.