Entre familia y amigos: la elección de la estructura de propiedad corporativa

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Entre familia y amigos: la elección de la estructura de propiedad corporativa

Author Info

Ramón A. Castillo Ponce (Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, California State University, Los Angeles)

Abstract

The document presents an analysis, developed under the framework of conflict theory, which models the choice of ownership structure as the result of a power struggle between the owner of a firm and potential shareholders. The theoretical model suggests that, when the system that protects property rights is inefficient, the choice of keeping the ownership of the firm within the family represents the strategy that provides the owner the highest value when going public.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.

Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 3-18
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Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:22:y:2007:i:1:p:3-18

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Web page: http://www.colmex.mx/centros/cee/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G0 - Financial Economics - - General
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000. "Investor Protection and Equity Markets," NBER Working Papers 7974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000. "Investor Protection and Equity Markets," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1906, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
Ramon Castillo & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 93-104, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Castillo, Ramon & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2003. "All in the Family or Public? Law and Appropriative Costs as Determinants of Ownership Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Ritter, Jay R., 1987. "The costs of going public," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 269-281, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Steinwascher, William, 2007. "Propiedad, gobierno corporativo y las estrategias de diversificación de las empresas mexicanas: Un estudio exploratorio
[Ownership, corporate governance and diversification strategies of Mexican f," MPRA Paper 11599, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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