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Learning from pondlife and fishermen: towards a modular financial services industry

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  • Aidan Walsh

Abstract

Purpose - Haldane has suggested that modularity would add sustainability to the financial system. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a route by which such modularity might be achieved. Design/methodology/approach - The paper attempts to explore the micro‐foundations of regulatory regimes as rule bound orders and demonstrate that externally imposed rules may not be absolutely necessary to constrain the behaviour of individuals or organisations. Voluntarily self‐agreed rules may allow for greater communication and monitoring among the participants in a group. This in turn can result in greater sustainability. The paper uses examples from the work of Ostrom on sustainable common‐pool resources to support this view. Examples are also given from the financial services industry. Findings - The paper suggests that non‐legislative, informal rules of behaviour may be a useful source of constraining unsustainable behaviour in the financial services industry. In turn these self‐enforcing rule‐bound regimes may facilitate one feature of sustainable systems – modularity. Practical implications - The paper suggests that stakeholders in financial systems may find it useful, on a bottom‐up basis, to facilitate the creation of groups of financial institutions that would create and then adhere to self‐enforcing rules that could result in sustainable practices. Originality/value - The originality of the paper is on the focus on self‐created and self‐enforced rule‐following and on using the work of Ostrom in a financial services setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Aidan Walsh, 2011. "Learning from pondlife and fishermen: towards a modular financial services industry," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 19(4), pages 312-322, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:19:y:2011:i:4:p:312-322
    DOI: 10.1108/13581981111182929
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ekkehart Schlicht, 2008. "Consistency in Organization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(4), pages 612-623, December.
    2. Beck, Thorsten, 2002. "Deposit insurance as private club: is Germany a model?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 701-719.
    3. Ostrom, Elinor, 2010. "Organizational economics: applications to metropolitan governance," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 109-115, March.
    4. Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 283-295, June.
    5. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241, Decembrie.
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