Stackelberg and Cournot competition under equilibrium limit pricing
AbstractProposes a model which shows that Stackelberg competition is not necessarily welfare- enhancing compared with Cournot competition. Shows that, although in a simple duopoly model prices in a Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than in a Cournot equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in an entry-deterrence framework, where post-entry competition is Stackelberg rather than Cournot. Derives conditions under which in this framework Stackelberg competition leads to lower expected welfare, in the case where demand is linear.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Emerald Group Publishing in its journal Journal of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 23 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5/6 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Haan,Marco & Maks,Hans, 1996. "Stackelberg and Cournot competition under equilibrium limit pricing," Research Memoranda 002, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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