Accounting conservatism, ultimate ownership and investment efficiency
AbstractPurpose–The purpose of this paper is to analyze and examine the role of accounting conservatism on firm investment behavior in China. Design/methodology/approach–By combining a developed theoretical framework and empirical study, this paper examines the impacts of accounting conservatism on firm investment. The sample and data are all collected from Wind and CAMAR databases. Findings–The paper finds that the association between accounting conservatism and capital expenditure is significantly positive when inside capital is not enough to use for investment, suggesting that conservatism can expend the level of investment by decreasing information asymmetry and cost of capital; however, the association between accounting conservatism and capital expenditure is significantly negative when inside capital is enough to use for investment, suggesting that conservatism can curtail the level of investment by mitigating the interest conflicts between management and outside shareholders and decreasing agency costs. Additionally, the paper finds that the severity of information asymmetry and agency problem affects the role of accounting conservatism on firm investment behaviour, and the association between accounting conservatism and capital expenditure is weaker for firms with ultimate ownership controller as local government or individuals. Originality/value–This is the first paper to analyze and examine the impacts of accounting conservatism on firm investment in China directly. The findings are also useful to explain the awkward predicament found by prior literature.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Emerald Group Publishing in its journal China Finance Review International.
Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.emeraldinsight.com
Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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