Conditional Transfers to Promote Local Government Participation in Mexico
AbstractMexico is a very centralized country mainly as a result of the involvement of the federal government (FG) in functions that would be more efficiently provided by subnational governments (SG). The concentration of activities in the FG is the result of two institutional features: the unclear legal assignment of expenditure functions across levels of government, and the assignment of sources of revenue that concentrates a larger share of revenues in hands of the FG. In the presence of multiple uses of federal transfers, and in the absence of information on the costs of providing SG services, the FG has been reasonably reluctant to decentralize more functions. As long as the FG remains in control of most of government revenues, it is important to ensure that the benefits from decentralization also accrue to it. The transfer of functions should avoid SG neglect of those functions that generate benefits to the rest of the country and keep control over the size of transfers. One instrument that can achieve both objectives is a widespread use of conditional grants.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA.
Volume (Year): VII (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
Contact details of provider:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Armstrong, Mark, 1995.
"Delegation and discretion,"
17069, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Armstrong, M., 1994. "Delegation and discretion," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9421, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Bomfim, Antulio & Shah, Anwar, 1994. "Macroeconomic management and the division of powers in Brazil: Perspectives for the 1990s," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 535-542, April.
- Shah, A., 1991.
"The new fiscal federalism in Brazil,"
World Bank - Discussion Papers
124, World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ricardo Tiscareño).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.