Political Competition and Bureaucratic Employment: A Formal Analysis of the Inefficiency in the Provision of Public Goods
AbstractThis paper presents a formal model to explore the effect of political competition on government performance relative to the efficient provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy. In contrast with other arguments that sustain there is a positive relationship between political competition and efficiency, the main result shows that political competition provides incentives for an excess of bureaucratic employment and an inefficient provision of public goods.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA.
Volume (Year): XXI (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
Contact details of provider:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ricardo Tiscareño).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.