IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/emc/ecomex/v21y2012i2p351-372.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political Competition and Bureaucratic Employment: A Formal Analysis of the Inefficiency in the Provision of Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo A. Gatica Arreola

    (Profesor-investigador, Departamento de Economía e Instituto de Investigación de Políticas Públicas, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas (CUCEA), Universidad de Guadalajara. Zapopan, Jal. Mexico.)

  • Georgina Soto Sotomayor

    (Asesora económica, Comisión de Desarrollo Rural, H. Cámara de Diputados. México, D.F. Mexico.)

Abstract

This paper presents a formal model to explore the effect of political competition on government performance relative to the efficient provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy. In contrast with other arguments that sustain there is a positive relationship between political competition and efficiency, the main result shows that political competition provides incentives for an excess of bureaucratic employment and an inefficient provision of public goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo A. Gatica Arreola & Georgina Soto Sotomayor, 2012. "Political Competition and Bureaucratic Employment: A Formal Analysis of the Inefficiency in the Provision of Public Goods," Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, CIDE, División de Economía, vol. 0(2), pages 351-372, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:21:y:2012:i:2:p:351-372
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economiamexicana.cide.edu/num_anteriores/XXI-2/05.EM_Gatica-Soto(351-372).pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political competition; government efficiency; size of government.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:21:y:2012:i:2:p:351-372. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ricardo Tiscareño (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cideemx.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.