Both Poe and Dupin, the detective character created by Poe, think like game theorists. The goal of this paper is to prove this conjecture. First, we show that each one of the three Dupin stories is filled with ratiocination that can be modeled according to game theory. Second, we briefly elaborate on the bargaining game that is lurking beneath the Poe’s whole trilogy. Third, we show that two very important decisions of Poe - as a young man, he left his foster father’s home; as a forty-year-old man, he took and published a temperance oath - are consistent with game-theoretic behavior.
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Volume (Year): 32 (2006) Issue (Month): 1 (Winter) Pages: 97-110 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:32:y:2006:i:1:p:97-110
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Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
"Two-sided matching,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
Elsevier.
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