This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Monitoring with No Moral Hazard: The Case of Small Vessel Commercial Fishing

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Orn B. Bodvarsson

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the skipper as a monitor of crew members on fishing boats. In contrast to the usual (principal-agent) approach, there is no moral hazard. Each worker's output is variable and average performance is not known. A monitor is hired to estimate average performance. A theory and test of share differentials between monitors and workers is developed. Monitoring is treated as a sequential sampling experiment. Share differentials depend on worker-specific output variability, size of labor force, and average team output. Empirical results using Oregon fishing data offer strong support for the model.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://college.holycross.edu/eej/Volume13/V13N4P421_434.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 13 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (Oct-Dec)
Pages: 421-434
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:13:y:1987:i:4:p:421-434

Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/o Iona College, 715 North Avenue, New Rochelle, New York 10801-1890 USA
Phone: (914) 633-2088
Fax: (914) 633-2549
Email:
Web page: http://www.iona.edu/eea/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Dr. Mary H. Lesser, Department of Economics, Iona College, New Rochelle, NY 10801-1890
Email:
Web: http://www.iona.edu/eea/publications/subandmem.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).

Related research
Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
  2. Lucas, Robert E B, 1979. "Sharing, Monitoring, and Incentives: Marshallian Misallocation Reassessed," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(3), pages 501-21, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sutinen, J G, 1979. "Fishermen's Remuneration Systems and Implications for Fisheries Development," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 26(2), pages 147-62, June.
  4. Joesph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 552-579, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. MacDonald, Glenn M, 1982. "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1038-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Two-Tier Labor Markets in Agrarian Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 162-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. John Pencavel, 1975. "Work Effort On-the-Job Screening, and Alternative Methods of Remuneration," Working Papers 443, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Benito Arruñada & Manuel González, 1997. "How Competition Controls Team Production: The Case of Fishing Firms," Economics Working Papers 261, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are over 21000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.