Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: Comparison of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership
AbstractThis paper discusses the sensitivity of the labor market outcome in the standard bargaining paradigms - monopoly union and efficient bargaining - to the existence of a budget constraint pending on the financing of the unemployment benefit. Consequences of how the unions value members and members' status (employed or unemployed) in their collective maximand, implications of union having control over membership, and, hence, of unemployment insurance coverage, are also considered, as well as of different fiscal scenarios on the form of financing the unemployment benefit bill.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels in its journal Journal of Economics and Econometrics.
Volume (Year): 55 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Unions; Wage Determination Models; Unemployment Benefit; Unemployment Insurance; Union Wage Bargaining; Union Membership.;
Other versions of this item:
- Ana Paula Martins, 2002. "Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: Comparison of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2002_06, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- H39 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Other
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ana Paula Martins, 2011.
"Compliance with the Institutional Wage in Dualistic Models,"
EERI Research Paper Series
EERI_RP_2011_04, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- Ana Paula Martins, 2011. "Compliance with the Institutional Wage in Dualistic Models," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels, vol. 54(2), pages 93-126.
- Ana Paula Martins, 2011. "Compliance with the Institutional Wage in Dualistic Models," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2011_15, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julia van Hove).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.