Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
AbstractSummary Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.
Volume (Year): 39 (2011)
Issue (Month): 9 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
disaster mortality political economy democracy risk public goods;
Other versions of this item:
- Keefer, Philip & Neumayer, Eric & Plumper, Thomas, 2010. "Earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5182, The World Bank.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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