How can the security of international trade be financed in developing countries? A global public good Approach
AbstractThe aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security. Our analysis is more specifically oriented toward the issue of financing developing countries, which must make a considerable effort to attain the required level, whereas the developed countries have already invested heavily in trade security since the events of September 11, 2001. First, we characterize security in the context of a global public good before studying the financing conditions and the discriminating criteria of the supply of the global public good security. We then present a critical analysis of the various possible sources and instruments for financing the global public good security and propose different financing scenarios, each one based on a specific allocation of responsibilities among the actors in security. We conclude by considering the role of the international institutions as managers of the financing and implementation of the security of international trade.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.
Volume (Year): 33 (2005)
Issue (Month): 8 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
Other versions of this item:
- Philippe Dulbecco & Bertrand Laporte, 2005. "How Can the Security of International Trade Be Financed in Developing Countries? A Global Public Good Approach," CAE Working Papers 33, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July.
- Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, October.
- Pritchett, Lant, 1995.
"Divergence, big time,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1522, The World Bank.
- Vicary, Simon & Sandler, Todd, 2002. "Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1501-1520, September.
- Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Transnational public goods: strategies and institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 493-516, September.
- J. Hirshleifer, 1985. "From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 221-223, January.
- Kunreuther, Howard & Heal, Geoffrey, 2003. " Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 231-49, March-May.
- repec:idb:brikps:8651 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sandler, Todd, 1998.
"Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action,"
Staff General Research Papers
1225, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Todd Sandler, 1998. "Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 221-247, August.
- Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2003. "You Only Die Once: Managing Discrete Interdependent Risks," NBER Working Papers 9885, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.