Various wholesale price equilibria for mobile virtual network operators
AbstractIn this paper, various equilibria are analyzed according to the leader-follower relationship between vertically integrated incumbents when downstream entries are present. This analysis broadens our understanding of the incentives involved in deciding the wholesale price, which can be applied to explain the different situations of diffusion of mobile virtual network operators in the telecommunications market. Several implications are derived to facilitate effective policy formulation and management.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Telecommunications Policy.
Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 10 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30471/description#description
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- Covadonga Gijón Tascón & Teresa Garín-Muñoz, & Teodosio Pérez-Amaral, 2012. "Satisfaction and protection of individual mobile telecommunications consumers," Documentos del Instituto Complutense de AnÃ¡lisis EconÃ³mico 2012-21, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales.
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