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Comparing the effects of defaults in organ donation systems

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  • van Dalen, Hendrik P.
  • Henkens, Kène

Abstract

The ability of patients in many parts of the world to benefit from transplantation is limited by growing shortages of transplantable organs. The choice architecture of donation systems is said to play a pivotal role in explaining this gap. In this paper we examine the question how different defaults affect the decision to register as organ donor. Three defaults in organ donation systems are compared: mandated choice, presumed consent and explicit consent. Hypothetical choices from a national survey of 2069 respondents in May 2011 in the Netherlands – a country with an explicit consent system – suggests that mandated choice and presumed consent are more effective at generating registered donors than explicit consent.

Suggested Citation

  • van Dalen, Hendrik P. & Henkens, Kène, 2014. "Comparing the effects of defaults in organ donation systems," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 137-142.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:106:y:2014:i:c:p:137-142
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. D. Simochkin I. & Д. Симочкин И., 2018. "Объединяя экономику и психологию: теоретические и практические аспекты (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2017) // Bringing Together Economics and Psychology: Theoretical and Practical Aspects (Nobel Pr," Мир новой экономики // The world of new economy, Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации // Financial University under The Governtment оf The Russian Federation, vol. 12(2), pages 98-109.
    4. Selina Schulze Spüntrup, 2023. "Does Implementing Opt-Out Solve The Organ Shortage Problem? Evidence from a Synthetic Control Approach," ifo Working Paper Series 403, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    5. Buffat, Justin & Goette, Lorenz & Grassi, Simona, 2020. "Thinking about and deciding to be an organ donor: An experimental analysis," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 265(C).
    6. Wachner, Jonas & Adriaanse, Marieke & Hoven, Mariette van den & de Ridder, Denise, 2022. "Does default organ donation registration compromise autonomous choice? Public responses to a new donor registration system," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(9), pages 899-905.
    7. Liu, Xin & Zhao, Ning & Li, Shu & Zheng, Rui, 2022. "Opt-out policy and its improvements promote COVID-19 vaccinations," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 307(C).

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