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Endogenous context in a dictator game

Author

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  • Thunström, Linda
  • Cherry, Todd L.
  • McEvoy, David M.
  • Shogren, Jason F.

Abstract

The early characterization of humans as narrowly self-interested agents has unraveled in recent decades due to advances in the behavioral sciences. There is convincing evidence that peoples’ preferences and decisions are shaped by their relationship with others and the context of their interactions. While previous studies have demonstrated that context can shape preferences, we consider whether people endogenously shape their own preferences by choosing their context. Using a one-shot game, we explore whether dictators actively seek or avoid information regarding the deservingness of their recipient. We find that four out of five dictators endogenously choose to close the social distance gap by finding out the deservingness level of their recipients, and they act on that frame – the deserving get more, the undeserving get less. We further show that the decision to seek more information about the recipient is systematic, explained by the cultural worldviews of the dictator.

Suggested Citation

  • Thunström, Linda & Cherry, Todd L. & McEvoy, David M. & Shogren, Jason F., 2016. "Endogenous context in a dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 117-120.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:65:y:2016:i:c:p:117-120
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.08.001
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    Cited by:

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    2. Priyodorshi Banerjee & Sujoy Chakravarty, 2021. "Dictator choice and causal attribution of recipient endowment," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 351-373, December.
    3. Chapkovski, Philipp, 2022. "Information avoidance in a polarized society," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    4. Carrasco, José A. & Harrison, Rodrigo & Villena, Mauricio, 2018. "Interdependent preferences and endogenous reciprocity," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 68-75.
    5. Yu‐Chin Hsiao & Simon Kemp & Maroš Servátka, 2020. "On the Importance of Context in Sequential Search," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1510-1530, April.
    6. Mata, André & Vaz, André & Mendonça, Bernardo, 2022. "Deliberate ignorance in moral dilemmas: Protecting judgment from conflicting information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    7. Hsiao, Yu Chin & Kemp, Simon & Servátka, Maroš, 2019. "On the Importance of Context in Sequential Decision-Making," MPRA Paper 94027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Joy A. Buchanan & Matthew K. McMahon & Matthew Simpson & Bart J. Wilson, 2017. "Smile, Dictator, You're on Camera," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 52-65, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dictator game; Context; Deservingness; Preference shaping; Endogenous information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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