Multiple facets of altruism and their influence on blood donation
AbstractEconomic theory provides a number of often complementary suggestions for modeling social motives related to altruistic behavior. Questionnaire research on altruism (Rushton et al., 1981) can enable identification of “facets” of altruism. But can we match these facets with pro-social behavior, stated reasons for such behavior, and theoretical concepts for modeling altruism? In this paper, we show that such matching is possible and plausible. Our questionnaire results suggest that overall altruism is related to charity giving, but not to blood-donation behavior. Only when investigating different facets of altruism separately can we link specific motives to specific behaviors.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
Volume (Year): 40 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
Intrinsic motivation; Crowding-out; Pro-social behavior; Philanthropic giving;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
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