Multi-sourcing as an entry deterrence strategy
AbstractThis paper studies the rationale for multiple sourcing. In a simple model of outsourcing that embodies technology transfer and the threat of competition from the supplier(s) due to imitation, we show that multiple sourcing helps to deter entry by the suppliers into the final goods market and enhances profitability of the outsourcing firm. Our explanation for multiple outsourcing differs from the standard arguments, which either reduce the double marginalization problem or eliminate supply bottlenecks.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Economics & Finance.
Volume (Year): 25 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165
Entry; Imitation; Multiple sourcing; Vertical technology transfer;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
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- Tarun Kabiraj & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2014. "Strategic Outsourcing with Technology Transfer under Cournot Competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1133-1140.
- Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, 2013.
"Foreign capital, Non-Traded Goods and Welfare in a Developing Economy in the presence of Externalities,"
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- Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, 2014. "Foreign capital, non-traded goods and welfare in a developing economy in the presence of externalities," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 249-262.
- Mukherjee, Arijit & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2014. "Can cost asymmetry be a rationale for privatisation?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 497-503.
- Bagchi, Aniruddha & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2014. "Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 455-465.
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