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Income distribution and exchange in a dynamic search model

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  • Yilmaz, Ensar
  • Ünveren, Burak
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    Abstract

    This paper studies the link between income distribution and trade mechanisms in a dynamic search model with two-sided asymmetric information. Buyers and sellers have imperfect information about the income levels of the other group. Furthermore, asymmetry of information about incomes is the source of price dispersion. In such a frictional environment, we capture the effects of a change in inter- and intra-class income distribution on the trade mechanism, which is represented by the expected trade volume and the flux of buyers and sellers in the market.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056010001334
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Economics & Finance.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 665-678

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:20:y:2011:i:4:p:665-678

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165

    Related research

    Keywords: Income distribution Search Asymmetric information;

    References

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    1. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Art, 2004. "Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-04-12-17-02-54-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2004.
    2. Caputo, Michael R, 1990. "Comparative Dynamics via Envelope Methods in Variational Calculus," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 689-97, October.
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    4. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2002. "Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Models Using a Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function," NBER Technical Working Papers 0282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1979. "Price competition, quality and income disparities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 340-359, June.
    6. Lamoureux, Christopher G & Schnitzlein, Charles R, 1997. " When It's Not the Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 683-712, June.
    7. Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1978. "A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Discussion Papers 335, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Alp E. Atakan, 2010. "Efficient Dynamic Matching with Costly Search," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1030, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    9. Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2003. "Housing Collateral, Consumption Insurance and Risk Premia: An Empirical Perpective," NBER Working Papers 9959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    11. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
    12. Caballero, R.J. & Hammour, M.L., 1991. "The Cleansing Effect of Recessions," Discussion Papers 1991_59, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
    13. Rob, Rafael, 1985. "Equilibrium Price Distributions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 487-504, July.
    14. Li, Yan, 2009. "The theory of fiat money and private money as alternative media of exchange," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 568-582, October.
    15. Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July.
    16. Wolinsky, Asher, 1987. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 284, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    17. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13, January.
    18. Jing, Bing, 2007. "Network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 7-13, April.
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