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Location choice, competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI

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Author Info

  • Kurata, Hiroshi
  • Ohkawa, Takao
  • Okamura, Makoto

Abstract

We investigate whether non-tradable service FDI is efficient from a welfare point of view. A fixed number of firms strategically decide which markets to locate in and then compete in quasi-Cournot fashion. Considering firm location in two symmetric markets, non-tradable service FDI may or may not be efficient for the source country, depending on the total number of firms, competition in markets and the curvature of the demand function. In contrast, non-tradable service FDI is always efficient for the host country and the overall economy. This implies that any policy that affects firm location between two symmetric markets will not be beneficial from a welfare viewpoint.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W4V-4RX077S-4/2/71f66905320652570ebefb47418f410d
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Economics & Finance.

Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 20-25

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:18:y:2009:i:1:p:20-25

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165

Related research

Keywords: Non-tradable service FDI Location choice Quasi-Cournot behavior;

References

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  1. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
  2. James Markusen & Thomas Rutherford & David Tarr, 2005. "Trade and direct investment in producer services and the domestic market for expertise," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 758-777, August.
  3. Suzumura, Kotaro & Kiyono, Kazuharu, 1987. "Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 157-67, January.
  4. Krugman, Paul, 1991. "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(3), pages 483-99, June.
  5. Seade, Jesus K, 1980. "On the Effects of Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 479-89, March.
  6. Brander, James A & Spencer, Barbara J, 1985. "Tacit Collusion, Free Entry, and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 277-94, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Beladi, Hamid & Chakrabarti, Avik & Marjit, Sugata, 2009. "Sequential Spatial Competition in Vertically Related industries with Different Product Varieties," MPRA Paper 19278, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Beladi, Hamid & Chakrabarti, Avik & Marjit, Sugata, 2010. "Cross-border merger, vertical structure, and spatial competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 112-114, November.
  3. Beladi, Hamid & Chakrabarti, Avik & Marjit, Sugata, 2013. "Cross-border mergers in vertically related industries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 97-108.
  4. Beladi, Hamid & Chakrabarti, Avik & Marjit, Sugata, 2014. "A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 79-81.

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