Antichresis leases: Theory and empirical evidence from the Bolivian experience
AbstractThe antichresis lease in civil law countries requires a lump sum tenant payment which is returned when the lease ends. The custody of the lump sum is the property owner's compensation. We present a theory of leases that emphasizes tenant liquidity risk and owner input moral hazard. Monthly rent leases dominate when tenant consumption depends importantly on owner supplied inputs. However, the antichresis insulates owners from tenant liquidity risk while rent contracts do not, making antichresis leases more attractive for tenant populations with greater liquidity risk. The empirical evidence from Bolivian property leases is consistent with the main model predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Regional Science and Urban Economics.
Volume (Year): 40 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Antichresis Anticredico Chonsei Property leases;
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