IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/regeco/v27y1997i1p17-45.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regional income and secession: Center-periphery relations in emerging market economies

Author

Listed:
  • Berkowitz, Daniel

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Berkowitz, Daniel, 1997. "Regional income and secession: Center-periphery relations in emerging market economies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 17-45, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:27:y:1997:i:1:p:17-45
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166-0462(96)02143-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1981. "Second best taxation as a game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 67-91, August.
    2. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
    3. Daniel Berkowitz & Beth Mitchneck, 1992. "Fiscal Decentralization in the Soviet Economy*," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 34(2), pages 1-18, July.
    4. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
    5. Treisman, Daniel, 1996. "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 299-335, July.
    6. Boadway, Robin & Pestieau, Pierre & Wildasin, David, 1989. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 157-176, July.
    7. Berkowitz, D. & Mitchneck, B., 1992. "Fiscal Decentralization in the Soviet Economy," Working papers 9202, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    8. Boskin, Michael J, 1973. "Local Government Tax and Product Competition and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(1), pages 203-210, Jan.-Feb..
    9. Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
    10. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    11. Alan Williams, 1966. "The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33.
    12. Westhoff, Frank, 1977. "Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 84-112, February.
    13. Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-1031, December.
    14. Steinberg, Richard S, 1987. "Voluntary Donations and Public Expenditures in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 24-36, March.
    15. Pauly, Mark V, 1970. "Optimality, 'Public' Goods, and Local Governments: A General Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 572-585, May-June.
    16. Bos, Dieter, 1979. "A voting paradox of fiscal federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 369-382, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio & Sempere, Jaume, 2006. "A theoretical model of nations, regions and fiscal integration," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 132-157, January.
    2. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Stermšek, Marko, 2014. "The Economics of Secession ? Analysing the economic impact of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia," CEPR Discussion Papers 10134, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2007. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 534-538, March.
    4. Gregoire Rota Graziosi, 2003. "The theory of `Internal Exit', a comment on Buchanan and Faith (1987)," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(12), pages 1-6.
    5. Daniel Berkowitz & David N. DeJong, 2000. "The Evolution of Market Integration in Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 334, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    6. Thierry Madiès & Grégoire Rota-Grasiozi & Jean-Pierre Tranchant & Cyril Trépier, 2018. "The economics of secession: a review of legal, theoretical, and empirical aspects," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 154(1), pages 1-18, December.
    7. Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2004. "La fragmentation politique, une revue de la littérature," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 193-223.
    8. Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI, 2001. "Une analyse économique de la sécession," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2003:i:12:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ignatius J. Horstmann & Kimberley A. Scharf, 2008. "A Theory of Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 427-453, March.
    2. Josef Falkinger, 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March.
    3. Lee, Kangoh, 2008. "Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 163-176, January.
    4. Amihai Glazer, 2014. "The Profit-maximizing Non-profit," Working Papers 131404, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    5. James Andreoni, 1998. "Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1186-1213, December.
    6. Wolfgang Buchholz & Richard Cornes & Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, 2009. "Existence and Warr Neutrality for Matching Equilibria in a Public Good Economy: An Aggregative Game Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 2884, CESifo.
    7. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September.
    8. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Nett, Lorenz & Peters, Wolfgang, 1998. "The strategic advantage of being less skilled," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 35-39, July.
    9. Chan, Kenneth S. & Godby, Rob & Mestelman, Stuart & Andrew Muller, R., 2002. "Crowding-out voluntary contributions to public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 305-317, July.
    10. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Puppe, Clemens, 1997. "On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 489-504, December.
    11. Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm & Lise Vesterlund & Huan Xie, 2017. "Why Do People Give? Testing Pure and Impure Altruism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3617-3633, November.
    12. Barham, Vicky & Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1997. "Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-22, July.
    13. Jim Andreoni, "undated". "Do Government Subsidies Affect the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Papers _033, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
    14. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1998. "An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis: The nature of beneficent behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 315-331, November.
    15. Tamai, Toshiki, 2010. "Public goods provision, redistributive taxation, and wealth accumulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1067-1072, December.
    16. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
    17. Etner, Johanna & Jeleva, Meglena & Jouvet, Pierre-Andre, 2007. "Risk perceptions, voluntary contributions and environmental policy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 130-139, September.
    18. Reisinger, Markus & Ressner, Ludwig & Schmidtke, Richard & Thomes, Tim Paul, 2014. "Crowding-in of complementary contributions to public goods: Firm investment into open source software," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 78-94.
    19. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July.
    20. Nobuo Akai, 2003. "When do Cost Differentials among Privately Provided Public Goods make Income Transfer Policy Effective?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(14), pages 1-7.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:27:y:1997:i:1:p:17-45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/regec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.