Fixed versus variable supply in the public provision of goods
AbstractUsing discriminatory price auctions with variable supply, we explore a situation in which a corruptible public employee is in charge of producing and allocating a finite number of goods among consumers with uniformly distributed valuations. The negative effects of corruption are lower when the employee's task is to "provide at least q0 goods" than when the employee is required to "provide exactly q0 goods".
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.
Volume (Year): 63 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941
Corruption Bribing Discriminatory price auctions Variable supply;
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- Yvan Lengwiler, 1998.
"The multiple unit auction with variable supply,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
1998-28, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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