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Optimal self-employment income tax enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Bigio, Saki
  • Zilberman, Eduardo

Abstract

Most models of optimal income tax enforcement assume that income is either random or solely remunerates labor, neglecting that auditing strategies may depend on observable inputs. This paper outlines a model to optimally monitor self-employed entrepreneurs when, in addition to reported profits, the tax collection agency also observes the number of workers employed (or any other input variable) at each firm. We show that, by conditioning the monitoring strategy only on labor input, it is optimal for the IRS to audit firms in a way that generates some empirical regularities, like the missing middle. We also show that the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by an indirect monitoring strategy that is consistent with actual IRS practices. In particular, the IRS calculates inputted income as function of labor. Whenever an entrepreneur reports profits that are lower than inputted income, she is randomly monitored. Finally, we formalize a model of optimal presumption taxation, in which inputted income is the tax base, to compare revenue collection across tax systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Bigio, Saki & Zilberman, Eduardo, 2011. "Optimal self-employment income tax enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(9), pages 1021-1035.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:9:p:1021-1035
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.011
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    Cited by:

    1. Laszlo Goerke, 2015. "Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(1), pages 120-143, February.
    2. Achkasov, Yu. & Pilnik, P., 2017. "Income Tax Effect on Economic Performance in Terms of Endogenous Choice between Labor and Enterprise Market," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 12-27.
    3. Mulligan, Casey, 2018. "The Employer Penalty, Voluntary Compliance, and the Size Distribution of Firms: Evidence from a Survey of Small Businesses," Working Papers 07020, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    4. Daniel Hungerman, 2023. "Tax evasion, efficiency, and bunching in the presence of enforcement notches," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(1), pages 43-68, February.
    5. Skrzek-Lubasińska, Małgorzata & Szaban, Jolanta M., 2019. "Nomenclature and harmonised criteria for the self-employment categorisation. An approach pursuant to a systematic review of the literature," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 376-386.
    6. Rema Hanna & Benjamin A. Olken, 2019. "Tax Administration vs. Tax Rates: Evidence from Corporate Taxation in Indonesia," CID Working Papers 361, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    7. Eduardo Zilberman, 2016. "Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self-Employment Income Taxes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(4), pages 511-544, August.
    8. Bag, Parimal K. & Wang, Peng, 2021. "Income tax evasion and audits under common and idiosyncratic shocks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 99-116.
    9. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2020. "Voluntary disclosure schemes for offshore tax evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 805-831, August.
    10. Aljoša Feldina & Sašo Polanec, 2012. "Underreporting and Minimum Wage," LICOS Discussion Papers 32412, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    11. Julio Cesar Leal Ordonez, 2014. "Tax collection, the informal sector, and productivity," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(2), pages 262-286, April.
    12. Alvaro Forteza & Cecilia Noboa, 2015. "Tolerance to Tax Evasion," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1015, Department of Economics - dECON.
    13. Alstadsæter, Annette & Jacob, Martin, 2013. "The effect of awareness and incentives on tax evasion," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 147, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    14. Guo, Jang-Ting & Hung, Fu-Sheng, 2020. "Tax evasion and financial development under asymmetric information in credit markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    15. Wu T.C. Michael, 2016. "Profit Tax Evasion under Wage Bargaining Structure," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 817-834, June.
    16. Annette Alstadsæter & Martin Jacob, 2018. "Tax Incentives and Noncompliance," Public Finance Review, , vol. 46(4), pages 609-634, July.
    17. Casey B. Mulligan, 2019. "The Employer Penalty, Voluntary Compliance, and the Size Distribution of Firms: Evidence from a Survey of Small Businesses," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 34, pages 139-171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Leal-Ordoñez Julio C., 2014. "The informal sector in contemporary models of the aggregate economy," Working Papers 2014-24, Banco de México.
    19. López, José Joaquín, 2017. "A quantitative theory of tax evasion," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 107-126.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal auditing; Tax evasion; Informal sector; Missing middle; Entrepreneurship; Presumptive taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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