Are we taxing ourselves?: How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes
AbstractWe let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 95 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Tax-shifting Tax liability side equivalence Learning Deliberation Voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2010. "Are We Taxing Ourselves? How Deliberation and Experience Shape Voting on Taxes," Vienna Economics Papers 1010, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Tiezzi, Silvia & Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Time Delay and Support for Taxation," MPRA Paper 51233, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Morton, Rebecca & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2012.
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CEPR Discussion Papers
9098, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Rebecca B. Morton & Marco Piovesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," Harvard Business School Working Papers 13-017, Harvard Business School.
- Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2013. "The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-209, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Matthias Weber & Arthur Schram, 2013. "The Non-Equivalence of Labor Market Taxes: A Real-Effort Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-030/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Warziniack, Travis W. & Finnoff, David & Shogren, Jason F., 2013. "Public economics of hitchhiking species and tourism-based risk to ecosystem services," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 277-294.
- Ackermann, Hagen & Fochmann, Martin & Mihm, Benedikt, 2012. "Biased effects of taxes and subsidies on portfolio choices," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 138, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
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