Can private giving promote economic segregation?
AbstractThis Paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and locational equilibria. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, may promote economic segregation rather than integration. In such a scenario, a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be Pareto-improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority-supported federal tax constitution.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 91 (2007)
Issue (Month): 5-6 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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