Time inconsistency of benevolent government economies
AbstractWhy do government policymakers in open-ended dynamic economic models with period-by-period re-optimization tend to exhibit time inconsistency, in the sense that they systematically deviate in later periods from earlier planned policy paths? This article develops necessary and sufficient conditions for time consistency for a general class of dynamic Walrasian economies that includes many previous economic models (Brock, Calvo, Kydland-Prescott, Fischer, etc.) as special cases. It is shown that the time inconsistency of government policymakers can be explained in this class of models as the consequence of successive structural changes in the constraints faced by the government policymakers as private agents carry out decisions in each successive time period conditional on anticipated future government policy settings. Annotated pointers to related work can be accessed at: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/dehome.htm
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (1986)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1986. "Time Inconsistency of Benevolent Government Economies," Staff General Research Papers 11206, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
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