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Political institutions, voter turnout, and policy outcomes

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  • Fumagalli, Eileen
  • Narciso, Gaia

Abstract

This paper tests whether constitutions directly affect economic outcomes. By introducing citizens' political participation as the driving force connecting institutions to policy outcomes, we empirically show that voter turnout is the channel through which forms of government affect economic policies. We provide evidence of the existence of two relationships. First, presidential regimes appear to be associated with lower voter participation in national elections. Second, higher voter participation induces an increase in government expenditure, total revenues, welfare state spending, and budget deficit. We conclude that forms of government affect policy outcomes only through voter turnout.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 28 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 162-173

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:2:p:162-173

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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Keywords: Electoral rule; Form of government; Voter participation; Policy outcomes;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Revelli, Federico, 2013. "Tax Limits and Local Democracy," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers, University of Turin 201336, University of Turin.
  2. Christian Ebeke & Thierry Yogo Urbain, 2013. "Working Paper 185 - Remittances and the Voter Turnout in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Macro and Micro Level Data," Working Paper Series, African Development Bank 989, African Development Bank.
  3. Estevan, Fernanda, 2013. "The impact of conditional cash transfers on public education expenditures: A political economy approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 268-284.
  4. Aggeborn, Linuz, 2013. "Voter Turnout and the Size of Government," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics 2013:20, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  5. Aggeborn, Linuz, 2013. "Voter Turnout and the Size of Government," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University, Department of Economics 2013:14, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.

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